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TRANSNATIONAL SUPERMARKET STANDARDS IN GLOBAL 
SUPPLY CHAINS 
THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF GLOBALGAP
Jaap van der Kloet*
Abstract
In recent years, West European supermarkets have been playing an active role in the global 
regulation of food safety. They have developed several transnational food safety standards 
and compelled suppliers of food products around the world to acquire certification under 
these standards. W hy and how did supermarkets do this? This article explores the emergence 
and evolution of transnational supermarket standards by analyzing the development of G lo­
balGAP, one of the most commonly implemented supermarket standards on farms throughout 
the world. In the literature the emergence of transnational regulation is often attributed to 
one or two factors that play an important role at a particular moment in time. The main a r­
gument made in this article is that the emergence of transnational supermarket standards is 
best understood when it is studied as a process. The development of GlobalGAP includes four 
main characteristics which may be helpful in analyzing the emergence of other transnational 
private standards.
Key words
Private food regulation, G lobalG ap, supply chain, transnational regulation, supermarket
INTRODUCTION
In our g loba l w orld , la rge  volumes o f food products cross state borders every 
day. The food we ea t and the ingredients it is made o f orig inate from d iffe ren t 
places in the world: beef may come from Argentina, haricots verts from Kenya 
or Senegal, wheat from France, palm oil from M alaysia  and mango and p i­
neapple from Thailand. This article is about the transnational regulation o f 
food safety, that is, the regulation o f food safety beyond nation-state borders.
Sound regulations fo r controlling the safe production, processing, transport 
and consumption o f these food products are important. N obody wants to b e ­
come ill from the consumption o f food products, as recently happened to almost
3 ,000 consumers in G erm any and 15 other countries1 due to the consumption
* j.vanderkloet@jur.ru.nl.
1 On 20 June 2011, Germany’s national disease control center, the Robert Koch Institute, 
reported 2,773 infected people, of whom twelve had died. Another 814 people had 
been infected with the life-threatening disease HUS (haemolytic uraemic syndrome) 
which is a severe complication of the EHEC infection. HUS has resulted in 27 fatalities to 
date. Five days earlier, the W orld Health Organization reported 109 EHEC and HUS 
cases in fifteen other countries.
(http://www.rki.de/cln_109/nn_217400/DE/Home/Info-HUS.htm l, 21-6-2011, h ttp ://  
www.euro.who.int/en/what-we-do/health-topics/emergencies/international-health-regu- 
lations/news/news/201 1/06/ehec-outbreak-update-18, 20-6-2011).
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of, it is believed, bean sprouts infected with the Enterohemorrhagic E. coli bac­
terium, better known as EHEC.2
Food safety regulations cannot prevent all incidents, as the EHEC outbreak 
demonstrates, but the assumption is that w ithout such regulations many more 
incidents would happen, fo r exam ple because farmers from d iffe re n t countries 
have d iffe re n t understandings o f what food safety is or how it should be 
achieved.
Food safety is regulated by both public and private actors through many 
d iffe re n t transnational regulations, such as the Codex Alimentarius and the 
G eneral Food Law (EG 1 7 8 /2 0 0 2 ).3 Recently, several d iffe re n t transnational 
supermarket standards have emerged. These are standards developed by su­
permarkets to guarantee food safety and qua lity  on farms around the world. 
The label transnational indicates that they a p p ly  to suppliers beyond, across 
and within national boundaries.4
Examples o f such supermarket standards include Tesco N ature ’s Choice, 
which was introduced in 1991 by the British re ta ile r Tesco; BRC G loba l Stan­
da rd  fo r Food Safety, which was introduced in 1 998  by British retailers united
2 According to the W orld Health Organization (WHO) ‘Enterohaemorrhagic E. coli (EHEC) 
is a harmful strain of the E.coli bacterium that can cause severe foodborne disease. It is 
transmitted to humans primarily through consumption of contaminated foods, such as raw 
or undercooked ground meat products and raw milk. The infection may lead to a life- 
threatening disease, such as haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS). [...] The prevention of 
infection requires control measures at all stages of the food chain, from agricultural pro­
duction on the farm to processing, manufacturing and preparation of foods in both com­
mercial establishments and the domestic environment. [...] The only effective method of 
eliminating EHEC from foods is to introduce a bactericidal treatment, such as heating 
(e.g. cooking or pasteurization) or irradiation.’ For more information about EHEC see: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs 1 2 5 /e n /.
3 The Codex Alimentarius (1963) is a collection of transnational standards, codes of prac­
tice, guidelines and other recommendations for food products. The main purposes of the 
Codex Alimentarius are protecting the health of consumers and ensuring fa ir practices in 
the food trade. (www.codexalimentarius.nl). See ftp ://ftp .fao .o rg /codex/P ub lica- 
tions/understanding/Understanding_EN.pdf.
The General Food Law includes general principles and requirements regulating food in 
general and food safety in particular. It lays down the responsibilities of food companies 
in food chains to guarantee food safety, including the obligation to establish systems and 
procedures for traceability purposes.
See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:031:0001:00 
24:EN:PDF.
4  Transnational regulatory regimes resemble international or global regimes. According to 
Meidinger (2009), the core difference is that the label transnational suggests that states 
are only one type of actor among others. Regulatory functions are increasingly distri­
buted among a wide array of actors, including government bodies, businesses, trade as­
sociations, professional organizations and non-governmental organizations. Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson (2009) see another main difference between the labels transnational 
and global. They say that transnational implies vagueness and blurred boundaries to a 
degree the label global could not. That label suggests activities taking place all over the 
world. This generalizing term is therefore less suitable for indicating regimes that regu­
late activities cross national boundaries, but which do not extend across the entire world.
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in the British Retail Consortium; and G lobalG AP (G lobal Partnership fo r G ood 
Agricultural Practices), which was introduced in 2001 by a group o f supermar­
kets in W est European countries. These standards still exist, a lbe it they have 
been reviewed and m odified several times in the course o f time. M ore than
100,000 food companies throughout the world  have implemented one or more 
o f these standards.
The emergence o f transnational supermarket standards gives rise to inter­
esting theoretical and empirical questions about the development, legitimacy 
and effectiveness o f these standards. W hy have transnational supermarket 
standards em erged to certify  farm s’ food safety performance? How is food 
safety protected in transnational supermarket standards? W h a t does it mean 
fo r local farmers when they have to comply with transnational standards? This 
article focuses on the first question. It explores the emergence and evolution o f 
transnational supermarket standards by analyzing the development o f 
G lobalG AP, one o f the most commonly implemented supermarket standards on 
farms throughout the w orld .5 In the literature, the emergence o f transnational 
regulation is often attributed to one or two factors that p layed a role a t a p a r­
ticular moment in time. The main argument m ade in this artic le is that the emer­
gence o f transnational supermarket standards is best understood when it is 
studied as a process.
The argument is constructed as follows. First, in section 2, the most relevant 
characteristics o f transnational supermarket standards are expla ined by com­
paring them with other priva te food standards. The results are then presented 
o f a literature study on factors that contribute to the emergence o f transna­
tional (private) regulation. The eight factors found in the literature are dis­
cussed in sections 3  and 4. The follow ing two sections describe the development 
o f G lobalG AP: section 5  focuses on the reasons why G lobalG AP has emerged 
while section 6  explains how G lobalG AP has evolved in the course o f time. The 
article concludes in section 7  by explaining why the emergence o f transnational 
supermarket standards is best understood when it is studied as a process.
TRANSNATIONAL STANDARDS
There are many definitions o f w hat a standard is. In general terms, a standard 
is a set o f rules to guide and judge behaviour in a uniform w ay.6 They transmit 
information to customers and end-users about a product’s technical specifica­
5 In October 2010, more than 102,000 farmers and growers in more than one hundred 
countries had their farms certified under GlobalGAP: h ttp ://w w w .g loba lgap .org / 
cms/upload/Resources/Publications/Flyer/100920_D-FactsFigures-low.pdf, 12-11­
2010.
6 Abbott and Snidal 2001, p.345.
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tions, its compliance with safety criteria or the processes by which it has been 
produced and sourced.7
Transnational standards developed by supermarkets have been studied 
extensively by Henson and Humphrey. In an article p repared  fo r the Interna­
tional W orkshop on G lobaliza tion, G loba l Governance and Private Standards, 
held in Leuven (Belgium) in 2008 , they argue the importance o f acknowledging 
the differences between standards.8 According to these authors, transnational 
standards created by supermarkets are often ‘thrown into the same (often 
negative) basket’ with public regulation and other priva te standards without 
appreciating their distinctions. The negative image o f priva te standards would 
have been influenced by a lack o f c larity  about the impact o f these standards.
Henson and Humphrey distinguish four categories o f standards, as shown in 
Figure 1:
Figure 1. Categories o f standards
Government Non-governmental
actor
Mandatory Regulations
Legally-m andated non­
governmental standards
Voluntary
Governmental voluntary 
standards
Voluntary non­
governmental standards
Source: Henson & Humphrey 2008
Transnational supermarket standards are represented in the fa r-r ig h t column 
below: they are designed by priva te actors, in this particular case by super­
markets, and they are voluntary in the sense that there is no legal compulsion 
on compliance. These standards can become m andatory in a commercial sense 
when compliance is a requirement to gain access to certain markets.
The position o f a particular standard may change over time. It is not un­
common fo r standards to m igrate between cells. Henson and Humphrey:
For exam ple, the Safe Q ua lity  Food series o f standards was o rig in a lly  
developed by the governm ent o f W estern Austra lia , which can be cate­
gorized  as a governm ental voluntary standard, but they were subse­
quently acquired by the Food m arketing Institute (an industry o rg a n iza ­
tion representing the US fo o d  re ta il and wholesale sectors), im plying re ­
classification as a non-governm ental voluntary standard .9
7  Nadvi 2008, p. 325.
8 Main parts of this paper have been published in an article in: Journal o f Development 
Studies 2010, 46 (9), p. 1628-1646.
9 Henson and Humphrey 2008, p. 3.
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Standards may also change in character. As the analysis below indicates, 
G lobalG AP has developed from a voluntary standard into a commercial, man­
da to ry  standard, a t least from the standpoint o f suppliers. Farmers have to 
have their farms G lobalG AP certified , because supermarkets and other food 
companies in the supply chain w ant to see a certificate before doing business.
The distinction between public and private standards is less clear than Fig­
ure 1 suggests. The difference between these standards is blurred by the rec­
ognition o f the various regulatory roles associated with standards: s tandard­
setting, monitoring compliance and enforcement.10 Public and private actors can 
perform  each o f these roles, alone and together. M any forms o f transnational 
regulation are characterized by a mix o f public and private organizations in­
volved in these regulatory roles. This means a m iddle category o f standards 
can be distinguished: standards where the regu la tory roles are perform ed by 
a mix o f public and private actors. The standard analyzed in this article is a 
truly priva te standard as it is set by supermarkets and monitored and enforced 
by external certification companies.
Transnational Supermarket Standards
Transnational supermarket standards have in common that they are designed 
by supermarkets in o rder to be adop ted  and implemented by their suppliers 
throughout the world. They vary, however, in the form they take, who im ple­
ments them, and the issues they address.11 Popular transnational supermarket 
standards are Tesco N ature ’s Choice, G lobalG AP (both a p p ly  to prim ary p ro ­
duction processes), BRC G loba l Standard fo r Food Safety, and IFS Food (these 
two a p p ly  to the processing o f food) (Figure 2).
Transnational supermarket standards can take two forms: individual com­
pany standards and collective standards. Individual company standards are set 
by individual supermarkets, mainly la rge  ones. Examples o f such standards are 
Tesco N ature ’s Choice and the A lb e rt Heijn Protocol, which was introduced in 
2009. Transnational supermarket standards can also be developed by coa li­
tions o f supermarkets, which may consist o f supermarkets from the same coun­
try, such as the British Retail Consortium, or supermarkets from d iffe re n t coun­
tries, such as G lobalG AP.
10 Henson and Humphrey 2008.
11 Henson and Humphrey 2008.
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Figure 2. Characteristics o f four popular transnational supermarket standards
Tesco Nature’s 
Choice
GlobalGAP BRC Global 
Standard for 
Food Safety
IFS Food
Standard
owner
Tesco FoodPLUS British Retail Con­
sortium
IFS (International 
Featured Stan­
dards)
Year of intro­
duction
1991 2001 1998 2002
Form Individual com­
pany standard
Collective stan­
dard
Collective stan­
dard
Collective stan­
dard
Scope Primary pro­
duction: fruits 
and vegetables
Primary produc­
tion: crops, live­
stock, aquacul­
ture
Processing, han­
dling, packaging 
of food products
Processing, han­
dling, packaging 
of food products
Issues - Food safety
- Workers 
health, 
safety and 
welfare
- Environmental 
protection12
- Food safety
- Workers health, 
safety and 
welfare
- Environmental 
protection
- Animal welfare
- Food safety
- Workers health, 
safety and 
welfare
- Environmental 
protection13
- Food safety
- Workers 
health,
safety and 
w elfare14
Number of 
certified sup­
pliers / coun­
tries
15,000 /  70 
(2009)’5
102,300 /  108 
(Oct 2010)16
13,067 /  104 
(Nov 2010)17
12,000 /  90 
(Feb 2010)18
Sources: see footnotes.
Transnational supermarket standards are designed to be implemented by su­
permarkets’ suppliers in d iffe re n t countries. These suppliers are the companies 
that sell food products d irectly to supermarkets and those companies upstream 
in the supply chain that produce, process and distribute food products. M any 
transnational supermarket standards focus either on the production or the 
processing stage in the supply chain. G lobalG AP and Tesco N ature ’s Choice,
12 http://www.tescofarming.com/tnc.asp, 17-11-2010.
13 BRC, Overview and Contents of BRC Global Standard for Food Safety Issue 5.
14 http://www.ifs-certification.com/index.php?page=home&content=public_content&desc= 
ifs_standards_food_5&language=english, 18-11-2010.
15 http://www.investis.com/plc/storage/tesco_cr_09.pdf, 18-11-2010.
16 http://www.globalgap.org/cm s/upload/Resources/Publications/Flyer/100920_D- 
FactsFigures-low.pdf, 17-11-2010.
17 http://www.brcdirectory.com /, 17-11-2010.
18 http://www.ifs-certification.com/download_public.php?ifs_testi_engl_okt2010_WEB. 
pdf, 18-11-2010.
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fo r exam ple, a p p ly  to prim ary producers19 -  farmers, growers, fishermen -  
while BRC G loba l Standard fo r Food Safety and the IFS Food standard a p p ly  
to companies that process, handle or pack food products.20
Transnational supermarket standards also vary  in the issues they address. 
The first transnational supermarket standards addressed food safety issues. 
M any o f them now also encompass requirements on environmental protection 
and labour conditions; some include animal w e lfare.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EMERGENCE OF 
TRANSNATIONAL (PRIVATE) REGULATION
Transnational regulation can be defined as the regional or g loba l diffusion o f 
norms and standards.21 It suggests regulatory regimes that reach or opera te  
beyond nation state borders, trying to regulate border-crossing activities or 
relations.
In the literature on transnational regulation, several explanations can be 
identified fo r why this specific form o f regulation has em erged.22 Two observa­
tions can be made on the literature. First, the factors contributing to the emer­
gence o f transnational regulation are rather w ide ly  dispersed in the literature. 
M any authors mention one or two factors. The d iffe re n t factors have not been 
studied in relation to each other. In this article e ight d iffe re n t explanations 
identified in that literature are brought together to try  to analyze the emer­
gence o f transnational regulation in a more in tegrated approach. Secondly, in 
explaining the emergence o f transnational regulation, many authors tend to 
focus on one moment in time, while a more historical approach may give a 
more complete explanation fo r why transnational regulations em erge.23 This 
article therefore tries to analyze the emergence o f G lobalG AP as a process. 
The eight d iffe re n t explanations found in the literature are presented below.
A  frequently identified explanation refers to weaknesses o f nation states as 
regulators o f border-crossing issues.24 Individual states have difficulties regu­
19 http://www.globalgap.org/cm s/front_content.php?idcat=2, 17-11-2010, h ttp ://w w w . 
tescofarming.com/tnc.asp, 17-11-2010.
20 http://www.brcglobalstandards.com /standards/food/what-does-it-cover/, 17-11­
2010, http://www.ifs-certification.com /index.php?SID=1f0ddcf58009b5d1d7d782d 
6e156007c&page=home&content=public_content&desc=ifs_standards, 17-11 -2010.
21 This definition has been inspired by the definition Veerle Heyvaert (2010) gives to, what 
she calls, ‘rules globalization’, that is ‘the regional or global diffusion of normative 
frameworks’.
22 Abbott and Snidal 2009, Bartley 2003, Bartley 2007, Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, 
Cafaggi 2011, Caswell and Bach 2007, Diller 1999, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006, 
Fransen 2011, Glasbergen 2008, Heyvaert 2010, Meidinger 2009, Spar 1998, Vorley 
et al. 2007.
23 Van der Kloet and Havinga 2008.
24 Abbott and Snidal 2009, Cafaggi 2011, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006, Meidinger 
2009.
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lating issues that reach beyond nation-state borders, such as environmental po l­
lution or markets that opera te  across state borders, because these issues fa ll 
under the jurisdiction o f more than one country. Also, when nation states try  to 
regulate transnational issues together, it has proved d ifficu lt to achieve regu la ­
tions; even when they exist, they are ra re ly  uniform ly implemented.25
M any o f the transnational issues that demand transnational regulation are 
somehow re la ted to public scares or other perceived risks.26 Scandals such as 
the EHEC outbreak, the nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011 and the oil debacle 
in the G ulf o f Mexico in 20 1 0  generate commotion and distrust and a demand 
fo r more (transnational) regulation and closer monitoring.27 This was also the 
case a fte r a number o f food safety incidents28 in the 1990s. These incidents 
contributed to a decline in consumer confidence in the safety and qua lity  o f 
fo o d 29 and in the capacity o f regulators to guarantee food sa fe ty.30 G overn­
ments responded to the a lleged decline in consumer confidence with stricter 
regulations.
The emergence o f transnational regulation may in itself encourage the 
emergence o f more transnational regulations, especially when the monitoring 
and auditing activities are associated with a decline in trust.31 As audits reveal 
failures in compliance they may, rather than building trust, generate distrust, 
leading to demands fo r more regulation.
Transnational regulation may also emerge out o f the need to harmonize e x ­
isting regulations. This need may be a response to fragm ented national regu la ­
tion (too many separate regulations, regulating d iffe re n t aspects o f a single 
issue) or may arise from an increase in the number o f priva te regulations regu­
lating the same issue.32 Harmonization may also be encouraged to reduce 
costs.
Regulating distributional effects o f existing transnational regulations can be 
another reason fo r developing transnational regulations. Distributional effects 
like the costs o f regulation and its impact cannot be regulated by public and 
private actors from one country.33 Costs o f rule-making, monitoring and en­
forcement transfer from nation states to priva te actors and between W estern 
developed states and developing states. Another e ffect re la ted to the deve l­
opment o f transnational regulation is a reallocation o f regu la tory powers,
25 Cafaggi (2011) suggests that ‘failure to reach political consensus over treaty-based 
solutions has triggered’ the development of transnational private forestry certification 
systems.
26 Meidinger 2009.
27 Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006.
28 Such as mad cow disease, hormones in beef, salmonella in eggs, dioxin in animal feed 
and pesticide residues in fruit and vegetables.
29 FAO 2006.
30 Jaffee and Masakure 2005.
31 Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006.
32 Cafaggi 2011.
33 Cafaggi 2011.
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which is likely to favour developed states over developing states and large 
scale companies over small ones.34 New transnational regulations may emerge 
to protect the interests o f small scale firms in developing countries.
Ambition and strategic interests are also reasons why regulators develop 
transnational standards. A t least, this is why Veerle Heyvaert thinks the Euro­
pean Union has developed REACH (EC 1 9 0 7 /2 0 0 6 ), ‘a world  standard fo r 
chemicals management’.35 The European Union believed it was ab le  to develop 
a g loba l standard and was pow erfu lly  m otivated to do so because o f two 
main interests: to protect the EU’s chemicals industry by imposing the same re ­
quirements on competitive non-European chemical industries, and secondly, to 
increase its g loba l influence.36
TW O  OTHER EXPLANATIONS
W hereas some o f the explanations mentioned above tend to locate the em er­
gence o f transnational regulation in the individual interests o f public and p ri­
vate actors, other explanations re late the emergence o f transnational regu la ­
tion to collective interests. The literature on the emergence o f transnational p r i­
vate regulation identifies two such explanations.37
These explanations suggest that companies develop standards either to 
solve collective action problems in their markets or because the standards are 
the outcome o f strategic negotiations among companies, states, NGOs and so­
cial movements about the regulation o f transnational problems in markets and 
societies.38 Tim Bartley, who studied the emergence o f transnational private 
regulations in the area o f forest products and app are l, calls these two ways o f 
explaining the emergence o f transnational priva te standards the m arket-based 
approach and the political-institutional approach (Figure 3).
34 Cafaggi 2011.
35 Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals. 
See: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/reach/index_en.htm.
36 Heyvaert 2010.
37 Bartley 2007, Caswell and Bach 2007, Diller 1999, Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, 
Fransen 2011, Glasbergen 2008, Meidinger 2009, Spar 1998, Vorley et al. 2007.
38 The first type of reasoning is discussed in Bartley 2007, Caswell and Bach 2007, Glas­
bergen 2008, Spar 1998, Vorley et al. 2007. The second one in Bartley 2003, Bartley
2007, Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, Henson and Caswell 1999, Henson and Humphrey
2008, 2010, Kerwer 2005.
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Figure 3. Two additional explanations for the emergence o f transnational private regulation
Market-based approach Political-institutional
approach
Key actors Firms Governments, NGOs, social 
movement organisations, 
companies
Driving factors Collective action problems 
rooted in dilemmas of repu­
tation, information and com­
petition
Political conflicts about regu­
lating global capitalism
Contextual factors Pressures and spotlights on 
companies and market condi­
tions
Neoliberal projects and insti­
tutionalized rules about free 
trade
Mechanism of institutional 
emergence
Cooperation for collective 
benefits
Conflicts and bargaining
Metaphor for new institutions Solutions Settlements
Theoretical background Institutional economics and 
rational choice theory
Historical institutionalism, 
some variants of organiza­
tional neo-institutionalism, 
rational choice theory
Source: Bartley 2007.
The market-based approach emphasizes the role o f m arket actors in constructing 
standards. This explanation suggest that incentives, risks and uncertainties in the 
market -  such as consumer concerns about product safety and working condi­
tions -  create collective dilemmas rela ted to reputation, information and com­
petition. Due to sharper media scrutiny and increased communication fac ilita ted  
by the Internet, much more is known about where our food products come from 
and the conditions under which they are produced.
In competitive markets it is unlikely, says Bartley, that one single company 
will tie itself down with stricter rules or costs fo r better inspections as this com­
pany fears it would be more expensive than competitors, with a consequent 
loss o f market share. This is even more the case when the reputations o f ind i­
vidual companies are interdependent. In such situations, some companies will 
a ttem pt to ride fo r free  on the efforts o f others to improve the industry’s repu­
tation. This free  ride r problem can be solved through collective action. If all 
supermarkets -  or a t least a good m ajority o f the la rg e r ones -  fo llow  the 
same standards, none is individually punished.39 Even better, fo llow ing the 
same standards enables those companies to share costs and collect credible 
information about how products are made. It also enables them to distinguish 
themselves from the ‘bad guys’ and to source their products from a la rg e r pool 
o f ‘responsible’ farmers.
The political-institutional approach goes beyond the argument that stan­
dards are developed by companies in response to external pressures. This ex-
39 Spar 1998.
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planation treats standards as the outcome or resolution o f conflicts among d if ­
ferent groups with unequal power and d iffe re n t demands and interests. The 
key players -  companies, states, NGOs and social movements -  d isagree on 
how transnational problems in markets and societies should be regulated. They 
barga in and negotiate about the best manner o f regulation. These negotiations 
are shaped by the power, facilities and strategies ava ilab le  to the d iffe ren t 
actors. The outcome may not be an optimum solution fo r any group o f actors, 
because companies p re fe r w eaker commitments with minimum enforcement, 
while NGOs and social movements p re fe r stronger, binding standards.40
Both types o f explanation are suitable to expla in the emergence o f trans­
national supermarket standards. They both suggest the involvement o f priva te 
actors in rulemaking and recognize the capacity and willingness o f those actors 
to solve problems in markets and society. Following the first type  o f e xp la n a ­
tion, transnational supermarket standards may have em erged from coalitions 
o f supermarkets, because they had collective problems which they wanted to 
resolve. According to the second type  o f explanation, the emergence o f trans­
national supermarket standards can be considered the outcome o f negotiations 
among governments, supermarkets, farmers, consumer organizations and other 
affected  groups about the best w ay o f regulating food safety in transnational 
supply chains.
The follow ing section examines the emergence o f G lobalG AP. G lobalG AP 
is a relevant case fo r studying the emergence o f transnational supermarket 
standards, because it can be considered as one o f the most popular standards, 
which is used by many farmers throughout the world to guarantee food safety.
THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBALGAP
The development o f the G lobalG AP standard (which was called EurepGAP 
until 2007) starts in 1 996. In that year, twelve European supermarkets and re ­
tailers -  Tesco, Safeways, Sainsbury’s, GB Supermarkets, Continent, Delhaize, 
ICA Handlarna, KF, A lb e rt Heijn, MARTINAVARRO, APO and Promodores41 -  
founded the Euro-Retailer Produce W orking G roup (Eurep). Their aim was to 
take first steps towards the harmonization o f their own standards and develop 
one European standard fo r G ood Agricultural Practices.42
According to Van der G rijp  et al., the basic idea o f establishing Eurep 
came from British supermarkets, which had three main reasons fo r developing 
EurepGAP.43 First, British supermarkets took the lead in the Eurep initiative be ­
cause they wanted to impose the same standards on overseas suppliers as they 
a lre a d y  d id  on national suppliers.
40 Bartley 2007.
41 Healy and Gunningham 2003.
42 http://www.ehi.org/en/about-us/history.htm l, 22-11 -201 0.
43 Van der Grijp et al. 2005.
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Secondly, the supermarkets were responding mainly to two, newly deve l­
oped food regulations, which imposed new obligations on British supermarkets. 
The UK Food Safety Act o f 1 990  included new obligations on British supermar­
kets and other food companies to take responsibility in guaranteeing food 
safety in supply chains. The EU’s program  o f harmonization o f maximum levels 
fo r pesticide residues in foodstuffs sold in the EU restricted the range o f pesti­
cides that were acceptable and lowered residue levels fo r other pesticides.44 
By working together on developing (costly) measures to fu lfil their new o b lig a ­
tions, no single supermarket was placed a t a m arket disadvantage.
Thirdly, British supermarkets were under particu lar pressure to take collec­
tive action because o f the government’s policy to publish the results o f the go v­
ernment’s residue monitoring program  annually, including the names o f the su­
permarkets that sell products that exceed the perm itted MRLs.45 As the la rger 
British supermarkets worked together, none o f them was individually penalized 
fo r taking efforts to improve the industry’s reputation.
Stricter regulations on product lia b ility  were also one o f the motives fo r the 
other supermarkets that set up Eurep, but it was not one o f their main ones. This 
is p ro b a b ly  due to the differences between the lia b ility  laws in the European 
Union and in the United Kingdom a t that time. In 1 996 , supermarkets in conti­
nental Europe were a ffected  by the European Directive fo r product liab ility , 
Directive 85 /374 /E E C . This Directive is based on the principle that producers,46 
including supermarkets, are liab le  fo r dam age caused by a defect in their 
product, regardless o f whether or not the dam age is their fault.
An im portant d ifference from the UK Food Safety Act, however, concerns 
the pa rty  who has to prove that the dam age was caused by the defective 
product.47 The Directive states that in such a case ‘the injured person shall be 
required to prove the dam age, the defect and the causal relationship between 
defect and dam ag e ’. The Food Safety Act, on the other hand, states that ‘the 
burden o f p roo f lies with the person or company accused; they need to p e r­
suade the court that they exercised due diligence on the balance o f p ro b a b ili­
ties’. Due to this difference, the fe a r o f being held liab le  fo r damages and inju­
ries was p ro b a b ly  a more im portant reason fo r British supermarkets to develop 
a single, common standard than it was fo r supermarkets on the continent. Some
44 Chan and King 2000, Humphrey 2008, Van der Grijp et al. 2005.
45 Chan and King 2000.
46 According to Article 3 of the Directive, a producer is: ‘the manufacturer of a finished 
product, the producer of any raw material or the manufacturer of a component part and 
any person who, by putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the 
product presents himself as its producer. Without prejudice to the liability of the produc­
er, any person who imports into the Community a product for sale, hire, leasing or any 
form of distribution in the course of his business shall be deemed to be a producer within 
the meaning of this Directive and shall be responsible as a producer.’
47 In both regulations, a product is defective when it does not provide the safety that a 
person may expect.
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supermarkets on the continent considered the liab ility  issue a normal p a rt o f 
any business activity and not an excessive constraint on the food sector.48
Supermarkets in continental Europe claim to have had two main reasons fo r 
developing EurepGAP: (re)building reputation, which was also im portant fo r 
British supermarkets, and reducing risks and costs.49 Until recently, food safety 
was not an im portant issue fo r many supermarkets in Europe. This changed in 
the 1990s when several food safety incidents occurred. Food scandals had the 
e ffect o f creating a feeling o f fe a r among large numbers o f consumers, le a d ­
ing them to question the safety and qua lity  o f food.50 Supermarkets considered 
food safety incidents and the media coverage fo llow ing those incidents as risks 
that could dam age their reputation and their future sales and earnings.51
Before 1 996 , European supermarkets responded to emerging incidents by 
creating firm-specific protocols to ensure the safety o f food. The twelve super­
markets and retailers that set up Eurep realized they had a common interest in 
guaranteeing the safety and qua lity  o f food products: if consumers lose confi­
dence in meat (BSE, hormones) or eggs (salmonella), this affects all supermar­
kets. This shared fa te  motivated them to start working together on a common 
standard fo r food safety. The advantage o f a common standard app lied  by 
all supermarkets was maximum pressure on suppliers to comply with the stan­
da rd ; leaving supermarkets the choice to source from as many certified suppli­
ers as possible.52 M oreover, supermarkets were provided with information 
about how their products were produced. They needed this information to reas­
sure their consumers that their food was safe.
A  second reason fo r supermarkets to develop EurepGAP was cost reduc­
tion. Before EurepGAP, each supermarket had to form ulate its own standard 
fo r the qua lity  and safety o f food. Formulating a standard generates two 
types o f costs: costs o f writing or rewriting the standard, which requires knowl­
edge, experience and time; and costs o f monitoring compliance and enforce­
ment, which requires company visits and capable  inspectors. By developing a 
standard together, supermarkets could share the costs and each supermarket 
no longer had to form ulate its own standard. Supermarkets also wanted to re ­
duce their inspection costs, so they decided that these costs in the EurepGAP 
standard should be borne by the farmers. As EurepGAP had to improve food 
safety, supermarkets expected few er recalls and consequently lower costs. The 
wish o f these supermarkets to reduce costs may also have been influenced by 
the emergence o f discounters in the 1 990s. Supermarkets in the Netherlands, 
fo r exam ple, had to reduce costs in order to be ab le  to compete with cheap 
supermarkets like A ld i and Lidl.
48 Fulponi 2006.
49 Fulponi 2006, Havinga 2006.
50 FAO 2006.
51 Fulponi 2006.
52 Havinga 2003, 2006.
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By (re)building reputation and reducing risks and costs, supermarkets ulti­
m ately aimed to gain more control over the w ay farmers in their supply chains 
produced their food products. They were frustrated that they suffered fo r fa il­
ures that, in their eyes, had been caused by other companies in the supply 
chain. This can be concluded from the fo llow ing statement by the chairman of 
the Dutch supermarket association CBL53 in a Dutch news article in 2001:
Being the fina l link in the supply chain, which has d irect contact with con­
sumers, and the firs t to be addressed in case o f unsafe food , superm ar­
kets are sick o f suffering fo r  fo o d  safety fa ilures caused by others in the 
supply chain.54
These words go to show the frustration o f Dutch supermarkets and their w illing ­
ness to take action to change this situation. A p paren tly  supermarkets had good 
hopes that defining and imposing a food safety standard together would ena­
ble them to prevent or reduce the negative effects o f food safety failures.
EVOLUTION OF GLOBALGAP IN COURSE OF TIME
The twelve supermarkets and retailers first go t to work on harmonizing the re ­
quirements fo r their suppliers o f fresh fru it and vegetables. According to Healy 
and Gunningham:
In November 1997 , members agreed on the firs t d ra ft  p ro toco l fo r  
G ood A gricu ltu ra l Practice (GAP), which represented the firs t step to ­
wards in tegra ted production, and a harm onization o f production stan­
dards. In August 1 9 9 9 , the firs t o ffic ia l version o f the EurepGAP P ro to ­
col was subject to consultation with growers, produce m arketing o rg a n i­
zations, verifica tion  bodies, agrochem ical companies, farm ers’ o rg a n iza ­
tions and scientific institutions.55
A fte r trials in 2 00 0 , the EurepGAP standard was o ffic ia lly  introduced in 2001. 
The standard set out a fram ew ork fo r G ood Agricultural Practice on farms and 
defined the minimal requirements acceptable to the leading supermarkets in 
Europe.56 It contained 2 5 4  requirements covering food safety (e.g. chemical 
use and traceability), environmental protection (e.g. waste and pollution man­
agement) and w orker w e lfa re  (e.g. personal hygiene and safety). The re­
quirements were d iv ided into ‘major musts’, fo r which 1 00%  compliance is com­
pulsory, ‘minor musts’, fo r which 95%  is compulsory and ‘recommendations’,
53 Centraal Bureau Levensmiddelenhandel.
54 Het Financieele Dagblad 15 maart 2001.
55 Healy and Gunningham 2003.
56 EurepGAP Protocol for fresh Fruit and Vegetables. Version September 2001.
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which are inspected, but compliance is not a prerequisite fo r the granting o f 
the EurepGAP certificate.
In the introduction o f the s tandard ’s document, Eurep recognized the efforts 
a lre a d y  made to minimize adverse impacts on the environment and encour­
aged further work to improve growers’ cap a b ility  in this area. Eurep stressed 
that all organizations in the supply chain should accept their share o f the tasks 
and responsibilities to ensure that EurepGAP is implemented. The task and re ­
sponsibility o f growers were to demonstrate their commitment to maintaining 
consumer confidence in food qua lity  and safety, minimizing detrim ental impact 
on the environment, reducing the use o f agrochemicals, improving the effic ient 
use o f natural resources, and ensuring a responsible attitude to w orker health 
and safety.57 Growers, who complied with the requirements and were in­
spected by an independent certification body approved by Eurep, could re ­
ceive the EurepGAP certificate. The first certificate was issued in O ctober 
2001.
Membership
Since 1996, both Eurep and EurepGAP have changed considerably.58 The 
membership o f Eurep has changed in two ways.59 First, the number o f super­
markets and their countries o f origin have increased. Supermarkets from six­
teen d iffe re n t countries in Europe, North America, Asia and A frica  have joined 
the organization. The to ta l number o f retailers has grown from twelve in 1 996 
to 46  in November 2010 . Most o f them still come from North European coun­
tries, such as G erm any (12), the United Kingdom (7) and the Netherlands (5).
The second im portant change has been the opening up o f membership to 
reta ilers’ suppliers. As members, suppliers are a llow ed to partic ipate  in stan­
d a rd  setting and decision making. Retailers and suppliers are equally re p re ­
sented in the organization ’s sector committees and the board consists o f an 
equal number o f supplier and re ta ile r representatives.60 Sector committees are 
responsible fo r technical decision making fo r the sector in which they operate. 
They are supported and controlled by a secretariat. Final decisions are made 
by the board. In recent years, the number o f companies with a supplier mem­
bership has grown well, from 109 in A pril 2 0 0 7  to 150 in M ay 200 9  and 168
57 EurepGAP Protocol for fresh Fruit and Vegetables. Version September 2001.
58 Humphrey 2008.
59 Humphrey 2008, Van der Kloet and Havinga 2008.
60 The standard has a third type of membership, which is open to companies from the input 
and service side of agriculture, such as companies from the crop protection industry and 
certification bodies. These so-called associate members give advice, but are not directly 
involved in the standard setting and decision making process. In M ay 2009, there were 
104 associate members (Europe: 69, South America: 9, Asia: 7, North America: 7, Africa: 
5, Central America: 3, Oceania: 3, Middle East: 1).
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in November 2 0 1 0 .61 These companies are mainly food processors, importers, 
exporters, and their associations. Most o f them come from European countries. 
In M ay 2 00 9 , fo r exam ple, more than two-thirds (109) were companies from 
European countries. The others came from South America (15), North America 
(8), A frica (8), Asia (4), the M idd le  East (3) and New Zealand (3).62
A  closer look a t the board and sector committees teaches us that while re ­
tailers and suppliers have equal representation, there are asymmetries in 
membership.63 Suppliers from developing countries are unequally represented. 
The board only has one member from a developing country, while the three 
sector committees Crops, Livestock and Aquaculture have only seven members 
who are not from Europe, the United Sates or New Zealand. All three sector 
committees are chaired by retailers. Obviously, there are unequal relationships 
between retailers and suppliers, and between developed countries and deve l­
oping countries. Small scale suppliers (farmers) from developing countries are 
represented in the sector committees by the A frica  Observer. This smallholders’ 
ambassador, who has been appointed by G lobalG AP , is invited to partic ipate  
in meetings but is not given voting rights. M eid inger has observed that transna­
tional regimes, such as G lobalG AP, tend to face northwards and have only 
haltingly and p a rtia lly  incorporated the voices and interests o f developing 
country suppliers and publics.64 This supports the statement by Konefal et al. 
that suppliers in developing countries have become standard takers while re ­
tailers in industrialized countries have become standard setters.65
Global Aspirations
Throughout the years, G lobalG AP has become an organization with g loba l 
aspirations. On the website it describes itself as ‘a priva te sector body that sets 
voluntary standards fo r the certification o f agricultural products around the 
globe. The aim is to establish one standard fo r G ood Agricultural Practice with 
d iffe re n t product applications capable  o f fitting to the whole o f g loba l agricul- 
ture ’.66 The geographical diffusion o f the members is only one p a rt o f this 
process. G lobalG AP exports its standard by having the standard benchmarked 
against SQF 1000 (Safe Q uality  Food), another international food safety 
standard, and by establishing partnerships with other industry organizations 
such as the G loba l Food Safety Initiative and with priva te organizations such 
as the W o rld  W id e  Fund fo r Nature (W W F).67 A t the same time, G lobalG AP
61 Humphrey 2008 and GlobalGAP website: http://ww w2.globalgap.org/m em - 
bers.html?memtype=associate, May 2009 and November 2010.
62 http://w w w 2.g lobalgap.org, 11-05-2009.
63 Fuchs et al. 2011, Konefal et al. 2004, Van der Kloet and Havinga 2008.
64 Meidinger 2009.
65 Konefal et al. 2004.
66 http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=2, 29-11-2010.
67 http://www.globalgap.org/cm s/front_content.php?idcat=44&idart=756, 29-11-2010 
and GlobalGAP Annual Report 2010.
18
Nijmegen Sociology o f Law W orking Papers Series 2 0 1 1 /0 3
has adopted  a policy that encourages the benchmarking o f national and re­
gional farm  standards against the G lobalG AP standard. This offers the possi­
b ility  to a d a p t G lobalG AP to national circumstances. Standards that have 
completed the benchmarking process are acknowledged as G lobalG AP 
equivalent. By November 2 01 0 , fifteen national standards had been fully 
benchmarked against G lobalG AP, including New Zealand GAP, ChileGAP and 
M exicoGAP.68
Guidance in Implementation
Another p a rt o f G loba lG A P ’s g loba l aspirations is to guide suppliers in their 
implementation o f the standard. G lobalG AP offers the possibility fo r national 
members to establish national technical working groups, whose role it is to d e ­
velop national interpretation guidelines and address specific local adapta tion  
and implementation challenges.69 These guidelines tell suppliers how the re ­
quirements should be interpreted and implemented in their specific context. In 
November 2 01 0 , 35 national working groups had been established in twelve 
European countries and twenty countries outside Europe.
Further indications o f EurepGAP’s g loba l aspirations include the 108 coun­
tries with certified farmers and the meetings and presentations held with the EU 
Commission, W TO  and several other national governments and development 
agencies about the role o f priva te voluntary standards and how they re la te  to 
national and international law. In response to these changes in membership and 
objectives, EurepGAP re-branded the name o f the organization and standard 
as G lobalG AP. This change was announced a t the 8 th g loba l conference in 
Bangkok in September 2 0 0 7  and came into force as o f 1 January 2008.
More Agricultural Products Covered
The G lobalG AP standard has also changed in course o f time. The range o f 
products covered by the standard has expanded. W hile  G lobalG AP in itia lly 
only app lied  to fru it and vegetables, it now also covers m eat products and fish 
from aquaculture, as well as p lant p ropagation m aterial and animal feed. The 
G lobalG AP standard currently consists o f four standards: G lobalG AP Inte­
gra ted  Farm Assurance Standard (fruit and vegetables), G lobalG AP Com­
pound Feed Manufacturers Standard (animal feed), G lobalG AP Plant P ropa­
gation M ate ria l S tandard and G lobalG AP Risk Assessment on Social Practice 
(worker welfare).
68 http://www2.globalgap.org/full_app_stand.htm l, 29-11-2010.
69 http://www.globalgap.org/cms/upload/Resources/Publications/FAQs/080229-FAQ- 
NTW G.pdf, 29-11-2010.
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New Versions
These standards are constantly improved and revised to ensure continued re le ­
vance and effectiveness.70 Since its introduction in 2 00 1 , three new versions o f 
G lobalG AP have been developed. The second version was introduced in 2004 , 
the third in 2007. Version four was introduced in March 2011.
The changes in the standard are also reflected in the number and status o f 
the requirements in each version. Version 1, fo r exam ple, counted a tota l o f 
254  requirements, while version 2 counted ‘only’ 210  requirements. This second 
standard, however, included more major musts and some issues had gained in 
importance, including pesticide residues, hygiene during harvesting and p ro ­
duce handling.71
Impact
The development and evolution o f G lobalG AP has placed food safety (higher) 
on the agenda o f more than 1 00 ,000  farmers in many countries. This has un­
doubted ly resulted in some improvements in the safety o f production processes 
on farms.
A t the same time, the emergence and evolution o f G lobalG AP may also 
have reproduced and m agnified power inequalities in g loba l supply chains, 
especially between supermarkets and their suppliers. First, G lobalG AP includes 
requirements that a p p ly  to farmers and growers, not to supermarkets. This 
makes supermarkets standard setters and farmers standard takers.
Secondly, many supermarkets in Europe as well as exporters, importers 
and national food traders demand a G lobalG AP certificate from their suppli­
ers. This has turned G lobalG AP from a voluntary standard to a commercially 
m andatory standard, leaving farmers with hard ly  any other option than to a p ­
ply fo r certification. It is suggested that this hinders or denies access to export 
markets fo r small scale farmers in developing countries. Such farmers are often 
faced with more difficulties to implement the standard than la rge  scale farmers 
or farmers in developed countries. In o rder to compensate fo r this distributional 
effect, G lobalG AP has introduced a regulation that allows farm ers to choose 
group certification. In that w ay farmers can reduce certification costs and re ­
quirements necessary fo r G lobalG AP can be centralized, such as pesticide con­
trol and building toilets and other facilities.
Thirdly, whereas suppliers do indeed partic ipa te  in decision making proc­
esses, they are la rg e ly  from developed countries, with fa r  less representation 
from developing countries.
70 http://www.globalgap.org/cm s/upload/The_Standard/Standards-Developm ent/GLO- 
BALGAP_Standard_setting_procedure_V1_Aug08.pdf, 29-10-2010.
71 Van der Grijp et al. 2005.
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CONCLUSION
This article has exp lored  the emergence and evolution o f transnational super­
market standards by analyzing the development o f G lobalG AP, one o f the 
most commonly implemented transnational supermarket standards on farms 
throughout the world. In the literature, the emergence o f transnational regu la ­
tion is often attributed to one or two factors that were im portant fo r the deve l­
opment a t one particular moment in time. In this article it is argued that the 
emergence o f transnational regulations is best understood when it is studied as 
a process in time.
The factors explaining the emergence o f G lobalG AP correspond with some 
o f the factors found in the literature. In short, G lobalG AP has em erged be ­
cause supermarkets wanted to gain more control in their supply chains and b e ­
cause they wanted to rebuild their reputation, reduce risks and costs, inspire 
consumer confidence in the safety o f food products and generate credib le in­
form ation about product specifications. These explanations correspond with 
Bartley’s m arket-based approach o f explaining transnational priva te  regu la ­
tion (regulations as solutions to collective action problems) and with the reasons 
suggested by H eyvaert72 (emergence due to ambition and strategic interests o f 
regulators) and M eid inger73 (new regulation in response to public scares).
W hen analyzing the d iffe re n t factors that have contributed to the em er­
gence o f G lobalG AP together, a development process can be identified that 
may be helpful in analyzing the emergence o f other transnational priva te 
standards. This process has four main characteristics. First, transnational super­
market standards are likely to emerge in response to commotions and concerns 
among large numbers o f people within and beyond nation states re la ted to 
real or perceived safety or health risks. The emergence o f EurepGAP can be 
seen as a response to a number o f g loba l food safety incidents during the 
1 990s which contributed to a decline in consumer confidence in the safety and 
qua lity  o f food .74
Second, fo r transnational supermarket standards to emerge there must be 
what Bartley calls, ‘pressuring actors’ who publicly demand measures to reduce 
or prevent the risks concerned.75 By doing so, these actors construct a situation 
that demands fo r the emergence o f transnational regulation. British and conti­
nental supermarkets reacted, fo r exam ple, to stricter government regulations.
Third, someone has to be held responsible fo r taking corrective measures. 
This is not necessarily the one who caused the incident. The G lobalG AP case 
demonstrates that supermarkets were pressured by national governments and
72 Heyvaert 2010.
73 Meidinger 2009.
74 FAO 2006.
75 Bartley 2007.
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NGOs to take measures against food safety incidents, which, according to su­
permarkets, had been caused by actors in other parts o f the supply chain.
A  fourth and final characteristic is that those who are held responsible fo r 
taking action are encouraged to develop new regulations, and are capable  o f 
doing so. These ‘institutional’ actors may be encouraged if they experience 
disadvantages o f being held responsible or see advantages in developing 
regulations. The supermarkets that developed EurepGAP were trigge red  by 
both; they experienced reputational dam age and increased costs, but they 
also saw a possibility to gain more control over their supply chains.
This article provides a prelim inary insight into the development o f one transna­
tional supermarket standard. In order to gain a more complete and re liab le  
picture, more research is required, fo r exam ple, on the emergence o f other 
transnational supermarket standards like BRC and Tesco N ature ’s Choice, or 
transnational standards in other food sectors and non-food sectors. An interest­
ing comparison would be between transnational standards developed by firms 
and transnational standards developed by NGOs or a combination o f firms 
and NGOs.
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